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SCOTT V. SANDFORD: THE COURT'S MOST DREADFUL CASE AND
HOW IT CHANGED HISTORY
PAUL FINKELMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Dred Scott v. Sandford' is unquestionably the most controversial deci-
sion in Supreme Court history. While the case's holding and doctrine are
no longer jurisprudentially important, its historical and cultural impact can
hardly be overestimated. Though surely an exaggeration, it has been said
that the case caused the Civil War. While other forces caused secession and
the War, Dred Scott surely played a role in the timing of both. After the
War, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were in part designed to
overturn its holding. In the modem era, politicians, lawyers, and jurists
recall Dred Scott, almost always to express their disagreement with the
case. Remarkably, during the 2004 presidential election, President George
W. Bush offered up Dred Scott when asked to name a Supreme Court deci-
sion he opposed.2 President Bush's answer may reflect his general igno-
rance about the Supreme Court, but it also illustrates how Dred Scott has
come to symbolize bad jurisprudence, or even "evil" in constitutional law. 3
Despite its reputation as a "bad" decision, Dred Scott is one of the
most significant cases in American constitutional history. A simple descrip-
tion of the case as found in U.S. Reports suggests its importance and com-
plexity. Each of the nine Justices on the Court wrote an opinion in the case:
only one of a few times before the Civil War that this occurred. 4 The opin-
ions range in size from Justice Robert C. Grier's half-page concurrence to
Justice Benjamin R. Curtis's seventy-page dissent. Chief Justice Taney's
"Opinion of the Court" is fifty-four pages long. The nine opinions, along
* President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy and Senior
Fellow in the Government Law Center, Albany Law School; B.A., Syracuse, 1971; MA and Ph.D.,
University of Chicago, 1972, 1976.
1. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. Second Bush-Kerry Presidential Debate (Oct. 8, 2004), available at
www.debates.org/pages/trans2004c.html.
3. See generally MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
(2006).
4. See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
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with a handful of pages summarizing the lawyers' arguments, consume 260
pages of U.S. Reports. The end result of this massive flow of ink was a
decision which declared unconstitutional that portion of the Missouri Com-
promise which prohibited slavery in all of the federal territories north and
west of the state of Missouri. In addition, the Court held that Congress had
no power to ever regulate slavery in the territories, despite the fact that
Congress had been doing so since the Articles of Confederation Congress
passed the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, 5 and the Congress under the
United States Constitution reaffirmed that law. 6 Finally, in a ruling that
shocked and angered many Northerners, the Court held that free blacks,
even in Northern states where they could vote and hold office, could never
be considered citizens of the United States or be protected by the United
States Constitution.
When first decided, there was strong support for the decision in some
parts of the nation and deep hostility in other parts. Today, a century and a
half after the case, it seems as though no one defends the outcome of the
case or Chief Justice Taney's analysis. 7 This fact makes the case signifi-
cantly different from most other controversial decisions. Most other deeply
controversial decisions are controversial because there is substantial dis-
agreement over the outcome, holding, or analysis. Most controversial deci-
sions have their supporters and opponents. They are controversial-and
remain controversial-because people disagree over their meaning, valid-
ity, or legitimacy. This is not the case with Dred Scott. Today it is virtually
impossible to find anyone who supports Taney's decision or the outcome of
the case. As the articles in this symposium show, Dred Scott is at the center
of controversies that are almost entirely one-sided. Scholars debate why the
decision was wrong, not if it was wrong. Even those scholars 8 who argue
that parts of the decision are consistent with mid-nineteenth-century under-
standings of the Constitution or with the original intent of the Framers9
don't actually endorse the decision. My own view is that the decision is
indeed consistent with the original intention of the majority of the delegates
5. Act of July 13, 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a).
6. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
7. A number of scholars-I include myself in this group--acknowledge that the decision, or at
least parts of it, is consistent with mid-nineteenth-century understandings of the Constitution or with
some of the Framers' original understanding of the Constitution.
8. 1 would include myself in this category.
9. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE
OF JEFFERSON (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, SLAVERY]; Paul Finkelman, The Constitution
and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PIr. L. REv. 349, 395
(1989) [hereinafter Finkelman, Constitution].
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at the Philadelphia Convention. But this conclusion is an argument against
intentionalism, rather than an argument in favor of the decision.
In 1857, when the decision came down, it was possible to find numer-
ous supporters of Taney's reasoning, analysis, and conclusions. Southern-
ers generally applauded the decision, and many were ecstatic over it. 10
Most Northern Democrats accepted it and even praised it. They hoped it
would forever end debate over slavery in the territories and, thus, eliminate
the newly formed Republican Party as a political force in the North. How-
ever, by this time a majority of Northern voters had rejected the Democrats
and their spineless support for slavery." Thus, most Northerners were
stunned and appalled by the decision. Horace Greeley, the editor of the
New York Tribune, the nation's leading Republican paper, responded to
the decision with outrage, declaring that Taney's opinion was "entitled to
just so much moral weight as would be the judgment of a majority of those
congregated in any Washington bar-room."' 12
I. MODERN USES OF DRED SCOT
While modern scholars and jurists might not endorse Greeley's caustic
assessment, most agree that the decision was not only wrong, but also per-
nicious and just plain bad! For example, a former Justice, Charles Evans
Hughes, who later returned to the Court as Chief Justice, argued that Dred
Scott was one of "three notable instances [in which] the Court has suffered
10. The Charleston Mercury praised the decision, declaring it was "not easy to overrate [it]," but
at the same time correctly predicted that the decision would "precipitate rather than retard" the "final
conflict between Slavery and Abolitionism," and warned against Southerners "abandon[ing]" them-
selves "to the delirium of a premature triumph." The Dred Scott Case, MERCURY (Charleston), Apr. 2,
1857, reprinted in PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 131 (1997).
11. This assertion is based on the presidential election of 1856. In that year, the infant Republican
Party nominated John C. Frrmont, a political newcomer with no experience as an officeholder. Never-
theless, despite Frrmont's lack of political experience and the newness of the Party, the Republicans
carried eleven of the sixteen free states, including three of the four most populous. By the time Taney
announced the Dred Scott decision, Republicans had taken over most of the state governments in the
North.
12. Horace Greeley, Editorial, TRIBUNE (N.Y.), Mar. 7, 1857, reprinted in FINKELMAN, supra
note 10, at 144, 145.
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severely from self-inflicted wounds."' 13 Similarly, Professor Alexander
Bickel of Yale Law School called it a "ghastly error." 14
Modem Supreme Court Justices see Dred Scott as the ultimate bad de-
cision and cite it not for authority but as a way of attacking those with
whom they disagree on the Court. Conservative jurists and legal scholars
cite Dred Scott as the Court's most notorious example of the judiciary
overstepping it bounds. For example, Justice Felix Frankfurter believed
courts should "refrain[] from avoidable constitutional pronouncements"
and thought "the Court's failure in Dred Scott v. Sandford" was one of
those "rare occasions when the Court, forgetting 'the fallibility of the hu-
man judgment,' has departed from its own practice."' 5 Similarly, in a 1992
dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
Justice Antonin Scalia complained that the Court's decision was not based
on "reasoned judgment" but only on "personal predilection."' 16 He then
implied that the decision in Casey was no more legitimate than Dred Scott.
Scalia wrote,
Justice Curtis's warning [in his dissent in Dred Scott] is as timely today
as it was 135 years ago: "When a strict interpretation of the Constitution,
according to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is
abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to
control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the
government of individual men, who for the time being have power to de-
clare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it
ought to mean."']7
More progressive jurists and scholars have also used Dred Scott as a
symbol of mistakes made by the Court. When the Supreme Court voted 8-1
to uphold racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson18 Justice John Marshall
Harlan, the lone dissenter, compared the Court's decision to Dred Scott: "In
13. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1928). Hughes
considered the other cases to be Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), and Pollock v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). Hepburn denied the power of the United States to
issue paper money. Two years later the Court reversed its decision in Hepburn, upholding the use of
paper money in Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), which together are
better known as the Legal Tender Cases. In Pollock the Court declared the federal income tax law to be
unconstitutional. This decision was effectively reversed by the Sixteenth Amendment.
14. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 41 (Yale Univ.
Press 1978) (1970).
15. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 590-91 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
16. 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17. Id. Justice Scalia quoted from Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 621 (1857)
(Curtis, J., dissenting). Casey was a case involving abortion rights. Opponents of reproductive choice
often compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to Dred Scott on the grounds that both deny liberty to
an oppressed group-fetuses and blacks. This is another example of using Dred Scott to discredit one's
opponents.
18. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite
as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott
case." 19 A half century later, Justice Hugo Black dissented from a majority
opinion, saying, "today's decision will no more aid in the solution of the
problem than the Dred Scott decision aided in settling controversies over
slavery." 20 More recently, while dissenting in a death penalty case Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., quoted Dred Scott to illustrate the way racism has
long been a factor in American law. Justice Brennan noted that the Justices
had only recently "sought to free ourselves from the burden of this his-
tory." 2'
Dred Scott is also used when a Justice opposes judicial negation of
state or federal law, even when the particular Justice might be sympathetic
to a different outcome. Thus, in refusing to strike down the State of Wash-
ington's ban on assisted suicide, Justice David Souter dragged Dred Scott
out of the jurisprudential closet in which it is usually kept to argue that the
Court should be cautious of second guessing a legislature. 22 Souter wrote,
... Dred Scott was textually based on a Due Process Clause (in the Fifth
Amendment, applicable to the National Government), and it was in reli-
ance on that Clause's protection of property that the Court invalidated
the Missouri Compromise. This substantive protection of an owner's
property in a slave taken to the territories was traced to the absence of
any enumerated power to affect that property granted to the Congress by
Article I of the Constitution, the implication being that the Government
had no legitimate interest that could support the earlier congressional
compromise. The ensuing judgment of history needs no recounting
here.23
Judges who cite Dred Scott today often see the decision as the product
of an overly ideological and reactionary judge-Chief Justice Taney-so
19. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
20. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 275 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
21. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343-44 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). McCleskey, an
African American, had been sentenced to death in Georgia. In appealing his death penalty McCleskey
presented overwhelming evidence that race was a major factor in death sentences and that blacks who
killed whites, as McCleskey had, were 4.3 times more likely to be sentenced to death than defendants
(white or black) who killed blacks. The Supreme Court rejected these statistics in upholding the death
penalty. Justice Brennan dissented in part, citing Dred Scott.
22. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756 (1997).
23. Id. at 758-59 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Oddly enough, Justice Souter is the
only Justice in living memory to cite Dred Scott favorably. In his dissent in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1995), he wrote,
Regardless of its other faults, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19
How. 393 (1857), recognized as a structural matter that "[t]he new Government was not a
mere change in a dynasty, or in a form of government, leaving the nation or sovereignty the
same, and clothed with all the rights, and bound by all the obligations of the preceding one."
Id. at 150 n.43 (alteration in original) (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 441
(1857)).
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bent on shaping public policy his way that he was willing to rely on poor
scholarship and weak legal reasoning. The decision was so "bad" that even
judges and legal theorists with diametrically opposed views on how to in-
terpret the Constitution agree on this conclusion.
The debate over the use of "original intent" analysis in constitutional
interpretation illustrates the universal rejection of Taney's decision. Propo-
nents of original-intent analysis argue that the Court must interpret the
Constitution according to the intentions of the Framers. They claim that
their approach eliminates personal preference from judicial interpretation.
Former federal judge Robert H. Bork, for example, argued that judges who
fail to follow original intent are simply "enforcing their own morality upon
the rest of us and calling it the Constitution. '24 Opponents of original-intent
analysis argue for what is called a "living Constitution." They contend that
the Framers used open-ended, indeterminate language in the Constitution
precisely because they did not want future generations to be concerned
about their intent. They argue that unlike a statute, which sets out narrow
and precise language to deal with a specific issue, a Constitution is de-
signed to articulate general principles that must be applied to changing
circumstances. Moreover, they argue the Framers themselves did not be-
lieve in original intent. As the Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Leonard W.
Levy wrote,
The failure of the Framers to have officially preserved and published
their proceedings seems inexplicable, especially in a nation that promptly
turned matters of state into questions of constitutional law; but then, the
Framers seem to have thought that "the original understanding at Phila-
delphia," which Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has alleged to be of
prime importance, did not greatly matter. 25
Opponents of originalism fondly quote Chief Justice John Marshall's
observation in McCulloch v. Maryland that "we must never forget that it is
a constitution we are expounding," and that this Constitution was "intended
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs."'26
Because all modern commentators believe Dred Scott was misguided,
even pernicious, proponents of original-intent analysis have labored to
prove that Dred Scott was not a decision based on original intent. Instead,
supporters of original-intent analysis argue that Dred Scott resulted from
24. Finkelman, Constitution, supra note 9, at 395 (internal quotations omitted).
25. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 2 (1988). On this
subject, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985). For a discussion of the problems of applying historical scholarship to original intent analysis,
see Finkelman, Constitution, supra note 9.
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819).
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Taney's desire to impose his own personal views on the law. Thus, in 1976
Justice William Rehnquist (later Chief Justice), a strong advocate of origi-
nal-intent analysis, wrote that Dred Scott is "[t]he apogee of the living
Constitution doctrine during the nineteenth century .... "27
However, jurists and legal scholars opposed to original-intent analysis
point to Dred Scott as a prime example of original intent and use it to illus-
trate the danger of such legal thinking. They note that Taney based much of
his argument on original-intent analysis. Taney wrote,
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feel-
ing, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe
or in this country, should induce the court to give to the words of the
Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were in-
tended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted.... [L]t
must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption. It
is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the
same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures the same
rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in
its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same
meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of
its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United
States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial charac-
ter of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or
passion of the day.28
Commenting on this passage, my co-editor on this symposium, San-
ford Levinson noted that Taney "sound[ed] altogether like Robert Bork,
who pronounced original intent the only legitimate modality of constitu-
tional interpretation .... ,,29 Similarly, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote
that "[t]he original intent of the phrase, 'We the People,' was far too clear
for any ameliorating construction. Writing for the Supreme Court in 1857,
Chief Justice Taney penned the following passage in the Dred Scott
case.. . ." Marshall then quoted Taney's language to the effect that blacks
"were not intended to be included" under the word "citizens" in the Consti-
tution.30
27. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 700 (1976).
28. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 426.
29. Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, in SLAVERY AND THE LAW 89,
103 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
30. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at
404). This understanding of Dred Scott and original intent is not limited to law professors and judges.
Carl T. Rowan, a nationally syndicated newspaper columnist wrote, "Thus, when someone comes to me
talking about 'strict construction' and 'original intent,' I assume immediately that I face a mind-set akin
to those of the Taney Court who decided Dred Scott .. " Carl T. Rowan, Equality as a Constitutional
Concept, 47 MD. L. REV. 10, 14 (1987).
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CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The use of Dred Scott by proponents and opponents of original-intent
analysis underscores the importance that modem scholars and jurists place
on distinguishing their views from those of Taney. The willingness of poli-
ticians, jurists, and scholars of all political stripes to use Dred Scott in de-
bates over modem issues illustrates the importance of the case to American
history and American legal culture. A century and a half after it was de-
cided, Dred Scott remains the quintessential "bad case" in our history. Ju-
rists, commentators and scholars can still score points against a modem
decision they dislike, if they can label it "like Dred Scott."
II. A PECULIARLY CONTROVERSIAL CASE
The universal rejection of Dred Scott makes it different from almost
all other controversial cases. Usually important and controversial cases
have both their detractors and their defenders. For example, many Ameri-
cans hate Roe v. Wade,31 but others embrace the decision. More than three
decades after the decision, political contests still turn on whether a candi-
date endorses or opposes Roe. At one time Lochner v. New York 32 was seen
as the twentieth-century equivalent of Dred Scott, and a whole period of
our constitutional history is known as the "Lochner Era."'33 Twenty-five
years ago it was virtually impossible to find anyone who defended the re-
sult in Lochner. Who could support the idea that businesses should be al-
lowed to exploit workers by allowing them (or requiring them) to work
absurdly long hours? Yet today Lochner seems less frightening to many
scholars. In a nation of hard workers, with many professionals (especially
young lawyers) working absurdly long hours and many more people hold-
ing down two jobs, the "exploitation" of bakers in New York may not seem
so horrible. Moreover, in recent years neo-conservative scholars and pro-
ponents of law and economics have argued that the case was correctly de-
cided because it allowed for individuals to take more control over their own
economic destiny. These scholars argue the case was actually a positive
development in American law. 34
Doctrinally, Lochner seems less dangerous today and more protective
of liberty than it once did. When the case was first decided the Court's
substantive due process argument was seen by many progressives as a
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
33. 2 MELVIN UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 558-60 (2d ed. 2002).
34. See David Bemstein, The Supreme Court and "Civil Rights" 1886-1908, 100 YALE L.J. 725,
733-36 (1990).
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threat to the ability of the states to protect the weakest members of society.
However, in subsequent cases-such as Meyer v. Nebraska35 and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters36-the Court used substantive due process to protect mi-
nority rights and expand civil liberties. In Roe37 the Court once again used
substantive due process to protect civil liberties and the civil rights of
women. In light of these cases, at least the theoretical basis of Lochner has
gained support, even if, on the merits, most scholars have little use for the
outcome of the case. Thus, Lochner no longer rivals Dred Scott as the most
reviled decision in Supreme Court history. Only Plessy,38 upholding "sepa-
rate but equal" segregation in public transportation, might rival Dred Scott.
Yet, some modem scholars argue that the case was not unreasonably de-
cided and that it was in fact inevitable. 39 Other scholars argue that the stan-
dard in the case--"separate but equal"-if enforced, would have provided
more equality and opportunity for blacks than did integration. 40 Thus, the
civil rights activist/scholar Derrick Bell can find some value in the doctrine
of Plessy,41 but finds no redeeming value in Dred Scott.
Significantly, when the Court decided Plessy, the lone dissenter, Jus-
tice John Marshall Harlan, predicted that the case would "in time, prove to
be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred
Scott case. '42 However, the universal distaste for Plessy is a relatively re-
cent development. Indeed, as late as 1954 the Supreme Court refused to
overturn Plessy, even as it also refused to apply the logic of "separate but
equal" to schools. 43 However, as noted, when it was decided Dred Scott
generated instant, although not universal, hostility throughout the North.
35. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
37. 410U.S. 113(1973).
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). For a critique of this position, see Paul Finkelman, Civil
Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973 (2004) (book review).
40. See Derrick A. Bell, Bell, J., Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK
CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 185, 186-87 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
41. See id.
42. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. The holding in Brown was narrowly confined to schools and technically did not overturn
Plessy as a general rule. In Brown the court held,
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plain-
tiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of
the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such
segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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Many Northern politicians, lawyers, newspaper editors, and clergymen
condemned it.
Less than a dozen years after the decision it was impossible to find
any support for Chief Justice Taney's position. The Civil War, the Emanci-
pation Proclamation, and two constitutional amendments had effectively
reversed all of Taney's holdings on race and slavery. Repeated acts by
Congress during and immediately after the War affirmed that Taney's as-
sertions of the lack congressional power to regulate the territories had been
effectively reversed.
III. THE NORTHERN HOSTILITY TO DRED SCOTT AND THE EMERGENCE OF
LINCOLN
Immediately after the decision, Horace Greeley, the Republican editor
of the New York Tribune published a pamphlet edition of Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney's opinion, paired with the withering dissent of Justice Ben-
jamin R. Curtis.44 This action was a function of Greeley's sharp political
instincts. Greeley correctly believed that an easily available text of the
Taney opinion, set off against Curtis's powerful dissent, would help the
Republican cause.
Writing in the Tribune, the nation's leading Republican paper, Greeley
responded to the decision with outrage, calling Taney's opinion "wicked,"
"atrocious," "abominable," and a "collation of false statements and shallow
sophistries." The Tribune declared that Taney's decision had no more va-
lidity than the opinions which might be expressed in any "Washington bar-
room." The Chicago Tribune, another important Republican paper, de-
clared that Taney's statements on black citizenship were "inhuman
dicta." 4 5
The black abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, called the decision "devil-
ish" and the "judicial incarnation of wolfishness. '4 6 However, Douglass
optimistically predicted that, in the long run, the decision would help the
antislavery movement. Rather than being depressed by the decision, Doug-
44. THE CASE OF DRED SCOTT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE FULL OPINIONS OF
CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY AND JUSTICE CURTIS, AND ABSTRACTS OF THE OPINIONS OF THE OTHER JUDGES;
WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THE POINTS RULED AND SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS (New York,
Tribune Assoc., 1860). Greeley also published the same 104-page pamphlet through a second publisher,
"Horace Greeley & Co."
45. Both papers are quoted in DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 417 (1978).
46. Frederick Douglass, The Dred Scott Decision: Speech at New York, on the Occasion of the
Anniversary of the American Abolition Society, (May 11, 1857), reprinted in FINKELMAN, supra note
10, at 169, 174.
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lass found his "hopes were never brighter. '47 Douglass assumed that the
reaction to this decision would lead to more support for abolitionists and
thus put greater pressure on slavery. He confidently predicted that the "Na-
tional Conscience" would not be "put to sleep by such an open, glaring, and
scandalous tissue of lies .... ",48 The election of 1860 would vindicate his
faith in the nation, or at least in the majority of voters in the North.
Douglass was of course correct. In the long run, and in what would
prove to be the short run, Taney's opinion was a key catalyst in creating the
crisis that would lead to Lincoln's election, secession, civil war, and the
end of slavery. It would be too much to argue that the Dred Scott decision
caused the Civil War; causation is never a simple matter. Surely the con-
flict over slavery would have eventually led to a breakdown of the Union.
But, Dred Scott had a great deal to do with the way this drama unfolded
and with the timing of the War.
The most important impact of Dred Scott was in its effect on presiden-
tial politics. This played out in two ways. To put the case most directly:
Dred Scott helped create Abraham Lincoln as a national politician and at
the same time it undercut the position of Stephen A. Douglas as a national
politician. This in turn set the stage for the splintering of the Democratic
Party and the rise of Lincoln as a national figure. I will turn back to these
party politics issues in a moment, but first it is important to understand
what Chief Justice Taney held in Dred Scott and why that mattered for
national politics.
IV. DRED SCOTT'S CLAIM
In 1846 the Missouri slave Dred Scott began a lawsuit to gain his
freedom. He had two claims for this freedom: that he had lived in a free
state (Illinois) and that he had lived in a United States territory (what was
then the Wisconsin Territory and what is today Minnesota) where slavery
was prohibited under federal law (the Missouri Compromise of 1820).49 To
understand the significance of the case and Taney's decision, it is important
to set out, in some detail, the law and facts surrounding these two claims.
Dred Scott was born a slave in Virginia sometime between 1795 and
1800.50 In 1818 Scott's owner, Peter Blow, left Virginia with Dred Scott in
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545; J. Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 645.
50. Scott is listed in an 1818 property tax record as being "more than sixteen years old." Paul
McStallworth, Scott, Dred, in DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN NEGRO BIOGRAPHY 548 (Rayford W. Logan
& Michael R. Winston eds., 1982).
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tow, eventually settling in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1830. Blow died in 1832
and the next year Dr. John Emerson, a U.S. Army surgeon, purchased
Scott. From December 1, 1833, until May 4, 1836, Scott lived at Fort Arm-
strong, which was located in Illinois near the present-day city of Rock Is-
land, where Dr. Emerson was the post physician. 51
Illinois was a free state, and Scott might have claimed his freedom un-
der its constitution. The claim for this freedom was rooted in the theory of
law, first articulated in Somerset v. Stewart, decided by the Court of King's
Bench in 1772.52 In that case, Lord Chief Justice Mansfield ruled that slav-
ery could exist only if there was positive law supporting the status of slave
and that if a slave entered a free jurisdiction, the slave would instantly be-
come free, because there was no law allowing the person to be held as a
slave. Most American jurisdictions, North and South, accepted this prece-
dent, although many free states allowed masters some rights of transit or
temporary sojourn with their slaves. 53 Starting in 182454 Missouri consis-
tently held that slaves gained their freedom if their masters allowed them to
work in a free state or live in a free state for more than a very short time.
The two and a half years that Dred Scott spent in Illinois were sufficient to
emancipate him either under Missouri law or Illinois law.55
Dred Scott did not, however, claim his freedom during this period.
Most probably, he simply did not know that under Illinois law he had a
right to his liberty. But, even if he had known of this right, it is unlikely
that at Fort Armstrong Scott would have found a lawyer to take his case. In
the 1830s some Illinois attorneys were willing to fight for a slave's free-
dom, even if the slave had no money to pay them. But, such activist attor-
neys were not found in the remote area around Fort Armstrong. It is also
possible that Dred Scott had no strong interest in seeking his freedom at
that time, in that place. He may have found Dr. Emerson a tolerable master
51. One of the best studies of Scott's life and the complicated facts surrounding the case is
WALTER EHRLICH, THEY HAVE No RIGHTS: DRED SCOTT'S STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM (1979). The
most important and comprehensive book on the case itself and its political impact is FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 45.
52. 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
53. For a complete history of this issue, see PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY,
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981). Until 1841 New York allowed masters to bring slaves into the state
for up to nine months; until 1847 Pennsylvania gave masters a six months right of sojourn.
54. Winny v. Whitesides, I Mo. 472 (1824).
55. Illinois was never a strong supporter of black rights or racial equality, and slaves visiting there
for a short period of time could expect little support for freedom from the state's courts. But, the state
did not allow slavery or allow slaves to be kept there for long periods of time. See FINKELMAN, supra
note 53, at 96-98, 150-55; FINKELMAN, SLAVERY, supra note 9, at 57-79; Paul Finkelman, Slavery, the
"More Perfect Union," and the Prairie State, 80 ILL. HIST. J. 248 (1987). A handy collection of the
Illinois laws dealing with slavery and race is found in STEPHEN MIDDLETON, THE BLACK LAWS IN THE
OLD NORTHWEST: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 269-329 (1993).
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and felt that freedom on the Illinois frontier was not terribly advantageous.
Most likely, Scott failed to assert a claim to freedom while in Illinois be-
cause, as an illiterate slave on an isolated Army base, he never learned that
he could become free.
In 1836, following Black Hawk's War, the Army evacuated Fort Arm-
strong, and Dr. Emerson, with Scott, ended up in Fort Snelling, in what was
then the Wisconsin Territory and today is the state of Minnesota. The Mis-
souri Compromise "forever prohibited" slavery in this region. Thus, when
Dr. Emerson and Dred Scott crossed the Mississippi River north of the state
of Missouri, they entered territory where all slavery had been prohibited by
an act of Congress. In addition to the Missouri Compromise, Scott had
another federal statutory claim to freedom when he took up residence at
Fort Snelling. Two weeks before Emerson and Scott headed to Fort Snel-
ling, Congress passed the Wisconsin Enabling Act, creating the Wisconsin
Territory. 56 This new territory encompassed most of the present-day states
of Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa. The Missouri Compromise, with its
ban on slavery, remained in effect, but the Wisconsin Enabling Act rein-
forced this ban by two new clauses. Section 12 of the Enabling Act de-
clared that settlers in the territory would "enjoy" all "the rights, privileges,
and advantages, granted and secured" under the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 and also "be subject to all the conditions and restrictions and prohibi-
tions" of the Ordinance. 57 This was a direct reference to Article VI of the
Northwest Ordinance which declared, "There shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the said Territory, otherwise than in the punish-
ment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted .... -58
The Wisconsin Enabling Act further declared that the laws of Michigan
were to be in force in the territory until they were repealed or modified. 59
Michigan also prohibited slavery.60 Thus, the Missouri Compromise, the
Northwest Ordinance, the Wisconsin Enabling Act, and the laws of Michi-
gan all prohibited slavery in the territory into which Dr. Emerson brought
Dred Scott and kept him for a number of years.
Dred Scott remained at Fort Snelling from May 1836 until April 1838.
During this period he met and married Harriet Robinson, a slave owned by
56. Act of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, 5 Stat. 10 (establishing a territorial government of Wisconsin).
This law went into effect on July 23, 1836.
57. Id. § 12, 5 Stat. at 15.
58. Act of July 13, 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 n.(a).
59. Act of Apr. 20, 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 10, 15.
60. See generally Roy E. Finkenbine, A Beacon of Liberty on the Great Lakes: Race, Slavery, and
the Law in Antebellum Michigan, in THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW 83 (Paul Finkelman & Martin J.
Hershock eds., 2006).
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Major Lawrence Taliaferro, the Indian Agent stationed near Fort Snelling.
Taliaferro was also a justice of the peace, and in that capacity he performed
a formal wedding ceremony for his slave and her new husband.61 This was
extraordinary and significant, and while not giving Dred Scott a new claim
to freedom, the formal marriage provided another factual basis for his
claim that he became free while he lived at Fort Snelling.
Under the laws of the Southern states, a slave could never be legally
married. Slave couples, of course, "married" each other throughout the
South. Often a master performed a ceremony for his slaves. Sometimes
white clergymen or slave preachers consecrated slave unions. Some slaves
simply announced they were married or went to their masters to ask per-
mission to live as a couple. Often slave communities developed their own
ceremonies exchanging vows such as "until death or master do part."
Slaves understood the precarious nature of their personal lives.
But whatever form a slave union took, a marriage between two slaves
itself was not legally recognized. 62 No Southern state allowed slaves to be
married under the eyes of the law for three important reasons. First, as law
students learn in family law, a marriage is a contract between three par-
ties-the two spouses and the state. Slaves could never have a legal mar-
riage because American slaves could not be parties to contracts.63 No
American slave state allowed slaves to make contracts or in any other way
perform legally binding acts, including marriages. Second, a legal recogni-
tion of slave marriages would have undermined the property interest of
masters. Such marriages might have limited the right of the master to sell
one of the partners. Finally, recognition of slave marriages might have led
slaves to claim other rights. The legal right to marry implies the right to
raise your own children, and under common law a husband or wife cannot
be compelled to testify against his or her spouse in a prosecution. A hus-
band at common law had a duty to protect his wife from assaults from oth-
ers, but slaves could never protect their wives from the assaults of their
masters or overseers. 64
Besides these legal issues, recognition of slave marriages would have
undermined the proslavery argument that slaves were childlike, immoral,
61. Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033, 1050
(1997).
62. After the Civil War all of the former slave states gave legal recognition to these unions by
allowing former slaves to register as married couples.
63. Under Roman law slaves could enter into some kinds of binding contracts. See Alan Watson,
Thinking Property at Rome, in SLAVERY & THE LAW 419 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
64. See State v. David, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 353 (1857) (upholding the conviction of a slave who
tried to prevent an overseer from beating his wife).
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and incapable of love, sexual fidelity, or even lasting affection. Most slave-
owners agreed with the racist assumptions of Thomas Jefferson that "love
seems with them [blacks] to be more an eager desire, than a tender delicate
mixture of sentiment and sensation. Their griefs are transient. '65 Most mas-
ters similarly agreed with the legal theorist Thomas R.R. Cobb that rape of
a slave was "almost unheard of"166 because rape took place when there was
no consent, and, as Cobb asserted, "the known lasciviousness of the negro,
renders the possibility of its occurrence very remote. '67 Racist beliefs such
as these allowed masters to separate slave families whenever convenient or
economically necessary without suffering any great pangs of conscience.
The recognition of slave marriages would have undermined the cultural
assumptions of slavery as well as its legal basis.
Thus, the civil marriage of Dred Scott and Harriet Robinson before a
justice of the peace might indicate that both Major Taliaferro and Dr. Em-
erson believed the two slaves had become free. The fact that Taliaferro,
acting in his official capacity as a justice of the peace, performed the mar-
riage himself would further support this analysis and could have led to an
argument that the marriage itself constituted a de facto manumission of the
slaves. However, after the marriage, Taliaferro gave Harriet Scott to Emer-
son, who continued to treat the couple as his slaves. This suggests that nei-
ther Taliaferro nor Emerson thought the Scotts were legally free.
Whatever their masters believed, the facts that the Scotts were living
in a free jurisdiction and were married in a civil ceremony with the knowl-
edge and consent of their owners could have been used as proof that they
were in fact free. Such an analysis would have gone like this: only free
people were entitled to a civil marriage; Dred Scott and Harriet Robinson
had a civil marriage; thus, they had to be free. But, once again Dred Scott
made no attempt to gain his freedom.
In October 1837 the Army transferred Emerson to Jefferson Barracks
in St. Louis. Because the trip down the Mississippi at that time of year was
dangerous, Emerson left Dred and Harriet Scott at Fort Snelling where he
rented them to other people. This fact could have significantly buttressed
their subsequent claims to freedom. By leaving the Scotts at Fort Snelling
and hiring them out at a profit, Emerson was in fact bringing the system of
slavery itself into the Wisconsin Territory. Courts in a number of states had
often made a distinction between bringing a slave and bringing slavery into
65. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, reprinted in THE PORTABLE THOMAS
JEFFERSON 23, 187 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
66. THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY § 107, at 100 (1858).
67. Id.
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a free jurisdiction. The difference was simple. A master traveling from one
slave state to another-say from Virginia to Missouri-might have to pass
through a free state, like Illinois or Indiana. That brief transit through a free
state did not bring the institution of slavery into the state and might not be
seen as imposing slavery on the state. However, if the master worked the
slave or hired the slave out, then the institution of slavery itself would have
been in the state, and the slave might legitimately claim his freedom. 68
While living at Fort Snelling, Emerson might have made the claim
that as an army officer he should be allowed to bring his slave to a military
post in a free jurisdiction, because it was convenient or necessary for him
to provide his own domestic servants. 69 Or, he might have claimed that
while in military service in a free jurisdiction, he was exempt from local
laws prohibiting slavery. But, once Emerson left Fort Snelling he could
surely claim no immunity from laws prohibiting slavery. There was cer-
tainly no reason why an army officer posted in a slave state had any reason
to leave a slave in a free jurisdiction and hire that slave out for his own
profit. Thus, his hiring out of the Scotts was an unequivocal violation of the
Missouri Compromise, the Northwest Ordinance, and the Wisconsin Ena-
bling Act.
In November 1837 the Army sent Dr. Emerson to Fort Jesup in Lou-
isiana. There he quickly met, courted, and, on February 6, 1838, married
Eliza Irene Sanford (who usually went by the name Irene). Emerson now
wanted his slaves, and in April they joined him in Louisiana. When the
Scotts arrived in Louisiana they might have sued for their freedom in that
state. For more than twenty years Louisiana courts had upheld the freedom
claims of slaves who had lived in free jurisdictions. 70 Had the Scotts
claimed their freedom in Louisiana in 1838, theirs would have been an
open-and-shut case. But, once again, they did not seek their freedom. It is
likely that they simply had no knowledge that the Louisiana courts rou-
68. Southern states also recognized this, in such cases as Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.)
467 (1820), and Winny v. Whitesides, I Mo. 472 (1824). Some American courts, however, freed any
slave brought within their jurisdiction. In Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836), for
example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that slaves became free the moment they were
brought into the state. This issue is discussed at length in FINKELMAN, supra note 53.
69. In 1850 lawyers for Irene Emerson would make such arguments before the Missouri Supreme
Court. EHRLICH, supra note 51, at 56. However, the Missouri Supreme Court had long before rejected
such arguments by a military officer in Rachael v. Walker, 4 Mo. 350 (1836).
70. The first Louisiana case on this subject is Adelle v. Beauregard, I Mart. (o.s.) 183 (La. 1810).
The most important case is Lunsford v. Coquillon, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 401 (La. 1824). Louisiana declared
slaves free if they had lived in free territories, free states, or foreign countries, like France, where
slavery was not legal. For a discussion of the cases in Louisiana, see FINKELMAN, supra note 53, at
206-16; see also JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT
OF LOUISIANA 250-88 (1994).
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tinely freed slaves who had lived in free jurisdictions. But, even if they had
such knowledge, it is not clear that at this point in their lives they were
ready to challenge their bondage or try to make a life for themselves as free
people in rural northern Louisiana.
The more interesting question is not why the Scotts failed to sue for
their freedom but why they came to Louisiana at all. Dr. Emerson had left
them in Minnesota, which was part of a free territory. They knew people
there, and probably could have found help if they had sought their freedom
or simply tried to escape from slavery. The trip down the Mississippi River
to Louisiana took them past numerous towns in Iowa and Illinois where
they might have left the ship and asserted their freedom. They could also
have jumped ship in St. Louis and melted into that city's growing free
black population. Instead, unaccompanied by their owner, or evidently any
other person with authority over them, they traveled over a thousand miles
in order to reach Dr. Emerson. Given their subsequent attempts to become
free after Emerson's death, we can only assume that at the time the Scotts
found their bondage to be mild and their lives reasonably happy. Emerson
had let them marry, had kept them together as a couple, and apparently
treated them well enough to prevent them from seeking their freedom. He
may also have told them that eventually he would free them, and the Scotts
may have not only believed him, but also thought that gaining a legal
manumission was worth the wait. So, they journeyed to Louisiana.
Their sojourn in the Deep South was brief. Within five months the
Army transferred Emerson back to Fort Snelling, where he remained from
October 1838 until May 1840. During this trip, on a Mississippi River
steamboat that was north of the state of Missouri-that is, in territory made
free by the Missouri Compromise-Harriet Scott gave birth to her first
child, who she named Eliza after Dr. Emerson's bride. Thus, Eliza Scott
was born on a boat in the Mississippi River, surrounded on one side by the
free state of Illinois and on the other side by the free territory of Wisconsin.
Under both state and federal law Eliza was born "free."
In May 1840 the Army sent Dr. Emerson to Florida to serve in the
Seminole War. On his way there he left his wife and slaves in St. Louis. In
August 1842 the Army discharged Emerson, and he returned to St. Louis.
He later moved to Iowa, a free territory, but left Dred and Harriet in St.
Louis where they were hired out to various people. In December 1843 the
forty-year-old Emerson died suddenly. His widow, Irene, inherited his es-
tate. For the next three years, the Scotts worked as hired slaves with the
rent going to Irene Emerson. In early February 1846, Dred tried to purchase
freedom for himself and his family, but Irene Emerson refused to sell Scott
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to himself. In April 1846 Scott filed suit for his freedom and that of his
wife and two children. 71
V. THE SUIT FOR FREEDOM
Why did Dred Scott suddenly sue for his freedom when he had failed
to make such a claim while living in free jurisdictions and had failed to try
to escape when his master abandoned him at Fort Snelling? Perhaps Emer-
son had promised Scott his freedom-or at least the right to purchase his
freedom-and when his master died suddenly without providing for it,
Scott felt it was time to seek another route to liberty. This theory would
explain Scott's behavior during his years at Forts Armstrong and Snelling
and his unsupervised trip to Louisiana.
It is also conceivable that Scott did not discover his freedom claims
until 1846. He may have learned this from sympathetic whites, including
the sons of Peter Blow, his former master. Sometime after his return to St.
Louis, Scott had renewed contact with the Blows who began to provide
financial aid for his litigation. It is also possible that Harriet Scott first dis-
covered the family's claim to liberty. While in St. Louis she had joined
Rev. John R. Anderson's Second African Baptist Church. Rev. Anderson
had been born a slave, but later purchased his freedom and became a type-
setter for Elijah P. Lovejoy, an antislavery editor in Alton, Illinois. 72
Anderson, or someone else in the church, may have informed Harriet Scott
that she was legally entitled to her freedom. 73 By whatever means they
discovered the possibility they could be free, when Dred and Harriet Scott
understood this-and decided to act on it-they easily found attorneys to
take their case. Given the state of Missouri law, they fully expected to win
their case.
Scott's lawyers assumed his case was an easy one to win. In 1824, in
Winny v. Whitesides, the Missouri Supreme Court freed a slave who had
71. The freedom claims of the four slaves were all different. Dred Scott based his freedom on
residence in Illinois and the Wisconsin Territory. Harriet Scott based her claim on residence in the
Wisconsin Territory. Eliza Scott, their older daughter, based her claim on her birth on the Mississippi
River north of the state of Missouri, in what was clearly free territory, and on her subsequent residence
in the free Wisconsin Territory. Their younger daughter, Lizzie, was apparently born in St. Louis after
the lawsuit began. Her freedom was based on the claim that her mother was already free at the time of
her birth, so she was also free.
72. In 1837 a proslavery mob from St. Louis crossed the Mississippi into Alton, in an attempt to
destroy Lovejoy's press, where he published the only antislavery newspaper in the region, the Alton
Observer. A member of the mob shot and killed Lovejoy while he attempted to defend his press.
Lovejoy became the first martyr in the abolitionist movement.
73. VanderVelde & Subramanian, supra note 61, at 1084-85.
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been taken to Illinois.74 In the next thirteen years the Missouri court heard
another ten cases on this issue, always deciding that slaves gained their
freedom by either working in a free jurisdiction or living there long enough
to be considered a resident.75 In this period Missouri was one of the most
liberal Southern states on this question.76 It was not, however, the only
slave state to reach this result. Courts in Kentucky, Louisiana, and Missis-
sippi also upheld the freedom of slaves who had lived in a free state or
territory. 77
These decisions were based on the legal theory, first articulated in the
English case of Somerset v. Stewart,78 that the status of a "slave" was so
contrary to the common law and natural law that only the enactment of
specific legislation could support it. In Somerset, Lord Mansfield, Chief
Justice of the Court of King's Bench, declared that
[s]o high an act of dominion [as the enslavement of a human being] must
be recognized by the law of the country where it is used.... The state of
slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any
reasons, moral or political;.., it's so odious, that nothing can be suf-
fered to support it, but positive law.79
Under the Somerset precedent, when a master took a slave into a jurisdic-
tion that lacked laws establishing slavery the slave reverted to his natural
status as a free person. Once he gained that status, he remained free.
74. 1 Mo. 472, 475-76 (1824).
75. The other Missouri cases are discussed in FINKELMAN, supra note 53, at 218-28. The last of
these, Rachael v. Walker, 4 Mo. 350 (1836), led to the freedom of a slave who been taken to military
bases in the North and in federal territories where slavery was illegal. These facts are almost identical to
those in Dred Scott.
76. Hundreds of successful freedom suits were never appealed, and thus there are no reports of
these cases. Records for nearly 300 cases for St. Louis County (which includes the city of St. Louis) can
be found in a database of the St. Louis Circuit Court Records Project developed by the Missouri State
Archives and Washington University in St. Louis. These cases often contain multiple parties, so the
nearly 300 cases involve many more individual slaves. I thank David T. Konig at Washington Univer-
sity in St. Louis for this information. These records can be found at Washington University, St. Louis
Circuit Court Historical Records Project, http://stlcourtrecords.wustl.edu (last visited Jan. 21, 2007). For
a discussion of these cases and the materials on the web site, see David Thomas Konig, The Long Road
to Dred Scott: Personhood and the Rule of Law in the Trial Court Records of St. Louis Slave Freedom
Suits, 75 UMKC L. REV. 53 (2006).
77. See Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467 (1820); Lunsford v. Coquillon, 2 Mart. (n.s.)
401 (La. 1824); Harry v. Decker& Hopkins, I Miss. (I Walker) 36 (1818).
78. 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
79. Id. at 510. For a full discussion of Somerset, see DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF
SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1770-1823 (1975); William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mans-
field ana the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86 (1974), re-
printed in I I ARTICLES ON AMERICAN SLAVERY: LAW, THE CONSTITUTION, AND SLAVERY 570 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1989); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA 1760-1848, at 20-39 (1977) [hereinafter WIECEK, SOURCES]. On the history of the applica-
tion of Somerset in the United States, see FINKELMAN, supra note 53, at 70-125.
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In The Slave, Grace, the English High Court of Admiralty modified
the Somerset rule. 80 Grace, a West Indian slave, had been taken to England
but then returned to Antigua with her master. She sued for her freedom
only after returning to Antigua. Lord Stowell, speaking for the English
court, held that Grace was still a slave. Stowell found that residence in Eng-
land only suspended the status of a slave. Without positive law, the master
could not control a slave in England, and could not force a slave to leave
the realm. But if a slave did return to a slave jurisdiction, as Grace had,
then the law of England would no longer be in force and the person's status
would once again be determined by the laws of the slave jurisdiction.
For the most part Southern states did not initially follow the The Slave,
Grace precedent. 81 Courts in Missouri, Kentucky, and Louisiana continued
to free slaves who had lived or worked in free jurisdictions. Well after the
The Slave, Grace decision, courts in Missouri continued to liberate slaves
who had lived in the North. Thus, Scott's lawyers no doubt expected him to
win his freedom.
However, in a trial before the St. Louis Circuit Court in June 1847,
Scott lost because of a technicality-he was suing Irene Emerson for his
freedom but he had no witness who could prove she now owned him. In
December 1847 the trial judge ordered a new trial, which would give Dred
Scott a chance to prove who owned him. Irene Emerson's attorneys chal-
lenged this order before the Missouri Supreme Court. In June 1848 the
Missouri Supreme Court sided with Dred Scott, granting him the right to a
new trial. 82 Two continuances, a major fire, and a cholera epidemic delayed
the case until January 1850, when the judge in the St. Louis Circuit Court
charged the jury that residence in free jurisdictions would destroy Scott's
status as a slave, and if the jurors determined he had in fact lived in a free
80. Rex v. Allan (The Slave, Grace), 2 Hagg. 94, 166 Eng. Rep. 179 (Adm. 1827).
81. In the nineteenth century American courts regularly cited English cases and often followed
them. English cases decided after the Revolution had value as intellectual "precedents" but were obvi-
ously not binding on American courts. The prevalence of American courts citing "foreign law" for its
precedential and moral value contrasts sharply with Justice Antonin Scalia's historically inaccurate
outbursts denouncing the use of foreign law as somehow being inconsistent with the intentions of the
Framers or past practice. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia wrote, "this
Court... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans." 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Foster v. Florida,
537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)). Similarly, in his concurrence in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Justice Scalia asserted that the "Framers would, I am confident, be appalled
by the proposition that, for example, the American peoples' democratic adoption of the death penalty
could be judicially nullified because of the disapproving view of foreigners." 524 U.S. 692, 750 (2004)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Similarly, in his dissent in Roper v. Simmons, he denounced
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, noting that "' [a]cknowledgement' of foreign approval has no place
in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court's judgment-which is surely
what it parades as today." 543 U.S. 551, 628 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
82. See Emmerson v. Harriet, II Mo. 413 (1848); Emmerson v. Dred Scott, II Mo. 413 (1848).
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state or territory, they should find him free. The jury sided with Scott and
his family. A jury of twelve white men in Missouri concluded that Scott's
residence in a free state and a free territory had made him free. This result
was consistent with Missouri precedents dating from 1824. Emerson, reluc-
tant to lose her four slaves, appealed this decision to the Missouri Supreme
Court. By this time she had left the state and the case was actually being
managed by her brother, John F.A. Sanford.83
VI. IN THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT
In 1852, in Scott v. Emerson, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
lower court and declared that Scott was still a slave.84 The decision was
frankly political. The court decided the case not on the basis of legal prece-
dent, but because of popular prejudice. Chief Justice William Scott stated,
Times are not now as they were when the former decisions on this sub-
ject were made. Since then not only individuals but States have been
possessed with a dark and fell spirit in relation to slavery, whose gratifi-
cation is sought in the pursuit of measures, whose inevitable conse-
quence must be the overthrow and destruction of our government. Under
such circumstances it does not behoove the State of Missouri to show the
least countenance to any measure which might gratify this spirit. She is
willing to assume her full responsibility for the existence of slavery
within her limits, nor does she seek to share or divide it with others. 8 5
Thus, Chief Justice Scott overturned twenty-eight years of Missouri prece-
dents.
The decision by the Missouri Supreme Court probably came as a relief
to both Emerson and her brother. After nearly six years, the case seemed
finally over. However, the case was only entering a new phase.
In late 1849 or 1850, Irene Emerson had left Missouri for Springfield,
Massachusetts. In November 1850 she married Dr. Calvin C. Chaffee, a
Springfield physician with antislavery leanings who later became a Repub-
lican congressman. Although no longer in Missouri, Irene Emerson re-
mained the defendant in Dred Scott's freedom suit before the Missouri state
courts. Her brother, a prosperous New York merchant with strong personal
and professional ties to St. Louis, continued to act on her behalf in defend-
ing the case. This set the stage for a federal court case. In 1854 Scott's
83. Sanford actually spelled his name with only one "d." However, when the case went to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court reporter mistakenly thought his name was Sandford. Hence, the
case is called Scott v. Sandford.
84. See Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 585 (1852).
85. Id. at 586.
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fourth lawyer, Vermont-born Roswell Field, took over the case.86 Field
conceived a rather brilliant strategy: to bring the case into federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. Article III of the United States Constitution
allows citizens of one state to sue citizens of another state in federal court.
Field argued that Scott, as a free person, was a "citizen" of Missouri and
thus entitled to sue Sanford, a citizen of New York, in federal court. Field's
position assumed two points that were as yet unproved: first, that Scott was
indeed free, and second, that if free, he was also a citizen of Missouri.
The first jurisdictional argument assumed the outcome of the case-
that Scott was free. This was not unusual. In freedom suits Southern state
courts regularly accepted a legal fiction that the plaintiff was "free" and
therefore had standing to sue. If the court ultimately ruled against the slave
plaintiff, the jurisdictional issues disappeared because the defendant con-
tinued to own the slave. However, in these state cases the second issue-
the claim of "citizenship" never arose. A black did not need to be a "citi-
zen" of a state to sue in state court. He or she only had to be "free."
But this was not true in federal court. For Scott to sue in federal court,
under diversity jurisdiction, the Court had to accept the arguments that a
free black could be a citizen of a state and a citizen of the United States.
Furthermore, the federal court had to accept the assumption that a black
living in Missouri, if free, was a citizen of Missouri.
Although a citizen of New York, Sanford continued to exert control
over the Scotts. He also continued to defend the case, because the Scott
family constituted a valuable asset. Since early in the litigation, Scott had
been in the immediate custody of the sheriff of St. Louis County. The sher-
iff had been renting Scott and his family out, collecting the rent, and hold-
ing the money in escrow until the case was finally settled. By this time a
tidy sum of money had accumulated. The winner of the case-either Scott
or his owner-would get this money once the case was finally settled.
By 1854, when the case reached the United States Circuit Court in St.
Louis, Charles Edmund LaBeaume, a brother-in-law of the Blow sons
(whose father had been Scott's first owner), was renting the Scotts. The
Blows had grown up with Scott and were deeply involved in helping him
gain his freedom. LaBeaume was instrumental in helping Scott obtain the
services of Roswell Field. Field brought the case into federal court for one
simple reason-to win Scott's freedom.
Dred Scott sued John Sanford in United States Circuit Court for bat-
tery and wrongful imprisonment. Scott asked for $9,000 in damages. This
86. See generally KENNETH C. KAUFMAN, DRED SCOTT'S ADVOCATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF
ROSWELL M. FIELD (1996).
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complaint was essentially a legal fiction, designed to bring the issue of
Scott's freedom into federal court. Scott did not expect to win any substan-
tial monetary damages from Sanford, but rather, he hoped to win a token
sum, which would prove that he was free. Scott's suit was against John
Sanford, because at this point Sanford was the one holding Scott in slavery.
Historians disagree over whether this was because Irene (Emerson) Chaffee
had sold or given Scott to Sanford or because Sanford was simply acting as
her agent. The historical debate is of little importance. Scott sued Sanford
and Sanford never denied he was the appropriate party to be sued. Instead,
he responded to the suit. Sanford knew that he was the one holding Scott in
slavery. If Scott was legitimately free, Sanford was wrongfully imprisoning
him.8 7
A. The Jurisdictional Issue and the Plea in Abatement
Before he could evaluate Scott's claim, Federal District Judge Robert
W. Wells first had to determine if the court had jurisdiction to hear the
case. This issue centered on Roswell Field's assertion that if Dred Scott
was free, then he must be a citizen of Missouri for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, and thus he could sue Sanford, who was a citizen of New
York.88
Sanford responded by denying that the court had jurisdiction over the
parties. Sanford did not deny that he was a citizen of New York or that
Scott resided in Missouri, but he did deny that Scott was a "citizen" of
Missouri. Sanford's response was in the form of a plea in abatement, which
87. Sanford's involvement in the case has long been a subject of controversy. Initially he simply
took care of his sister's business interests in St. Louis and, thus, managed the case after Irene left the
city. In the federal cases he is referred to as Dred Scott's owner. Whether he was the actual owner is
unclear. It is possible that Irene Emerson sold the Scotts to her brother when she left the state. Sanford
consistently maintained he owned the Scotts in all litigation in the federal courts, but there is no evi-
dence of a transfer of the slaves to him. After the case ended, moreover, the children of Dred Scott's
former master purchased him and his family from Mrs. Irene (Emerson) Chaffee, and not from Sanford.
Thus, it is possible that Sanford never owned the Scotts, but exerted control over them while acting as
his sister's agent. As their defacto owner, Sanford may have seen no reason to dispute Dred Scott's
claim that Sanford was the proper defendant, since he actually held them in slavery. Some scholars have
also argued that Sanford acted as the executor for Dr. Emerson's estate, although this seems highly
unlikely, since there is no evidence that he ever was appointed to that position. Moreover, by 1854,
when the federal case began, the Emerson estate had been fully settled.
88. Scholars and politicians have questioned the legitimacy of Scott's suit on the grounds that
Sanford did not actually own Scott. These commentators have argued that Scott therefore had no diver-
sity claim because he could not sue Sanford. The implication is that there was something illegitimate
about making Sanford the defendant just to get diversity jurisdiction and move the case to federal court.
However, this argument makes no sense. If Sanford was not Scott's owner then Scott belonged to Irene
Emerson Chaffee, who by this time was a citizen of Massachusetts. Thus, either way Scott would have
been able to make a claim that there was diversity of state citizenship between the plaintiff (Scott) and
the defendant (either Irene Chaffee or John Sanford).
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effectively asked the Court to stop-or "abate"-the case immediately and
throw Scott's suit out of court on the grounds that the court had no jurisdic-
tion to hear the case.
In his plea in abatement, Sanford argued that "Dred Scott, is not a citi-
zen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in his declaration, because he is a
negro of African descent; his ancestors were of pure African blood, and
were brought into this country and sold as negro slaves .... -"89 In essence,
Sanford argued that no black could be a citizen of Missouri, and thus even
if Dred Scott were free, the federal court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case.
Judge Wells rejected Sanford's plea. Wells, a slaveowner originally
from Virginia, was certainly neither an advocate of black equality nor an
opponent of slavery. But he did believe that free blacks, even in the South,
were entitled to minimal legal rights, including the right to sue in a federal
court. Scott, in other words, would have a right to sue in federal court to
determine if Sanford had illegally harmed him. In reaching this conclusion,
Wells did not declare that Scott, or any free black, was entitled to full legal,
social, or political equality in Missouri or anywhere else in the country.
Wells merely held that the term "citizen" in Article III of the Constitution
was equivalent to a free-non-slave-full-time resident or inhabitant of a
state. If Dred Scott was in fact not a slave, then he met this minimal crite-
rion and was a "citizen" solely for the purpose of suing in federal court.
B. The Case in the Federal District Court
By rejecting Sanford's plea in abatement, Judge Wells forced Sanford
to defend himself on the merits of the case. Sanford offered a series of pro
forma pleas that responded in kind to Scott's pro forma complaint. Scott
claimed Sanford had illegally restrained him of his liberty and committed
assault and battery on him. Sanford responded that he had not unlawfully
harmed Scott. Sanford did not deny that he had "gently laid his hands
upon" Scott and his family. Sanford admitted that he had "restrained them
of their liberty" but he asserted "he had a right to do" this because the
Scotts were his slaves. 90 In essence, Sanford admitted that he had done all
the things of which Scott complained, although with a "humane" spin on
the facts. But Sanford argued he was entitled to treat Scott in this manner
because he legally owned Scott.
89. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 396-97 (1857).
90. FEHRENBAC1-ER, supra note 45, at 279 (quoting Missouri U.S. Circuit Court records).
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In May 1854 the case went to trial where Judge Wells told the jury
that Scott's status was to be determined by Missouri law. Since the Mis-
souri Supreme Court had already decided that Scott was a slave, the federal
jury upheld his status as a slave. If an Illinois court had previously declared
Scott free, then the result would have been different. Judge Wells might
then have held that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitu-
tion, that Missouri was obligated to recognize the judicial proceedings that
had emancipated Scott.91 But, no such proceeding had in fact ever taken
place in Illinois or in the Wisconsin Territory. Thus, Scott and his family
remained slaves.
VII. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
The next stop in Dred Scott's legal odyssey was the United States Su-
preme Court. An appeal would be more expensive than the Blows, by now
Scott's main financial patrons, could afford. Moreover, this was not a case
that Scott's lawyer, Rosewell Field, was able to finance or even argue.
However, Montgomery Blair, a Washington lawyer well connected to Mis-
souri politics, agreed to take the case for free. Blair was not an opponent of
slavery per se and did not care particularly how slavery affected blacks. But
he was a member of the Free Soil wing of the Democratic Party and thus
opposed the spread of slavery into the territories. He would later join the
Republican Party and serve as Lincoln's Postmaster General. Sanford,
meanwhile, retained Missouri's proslavery United States Senator, Henry S.
Geyer, and more importantly, Reverdy Johnson. This Maryland politician
was one of the most distinguished constitutional lawyers in the nation as
well as a close friend of Chief Justice Taney. According to historian Don
Fehrenbacher, Johnson was a "veteran of many famous court battles" who
"added luster to any legal cause that he undertook" and who "made oppos-
ing attorneys apprehensive. '92
Blair sought other attorneys to assist him, but no one stepped forward.
Curiously few antislavery politicians or lawyers saw the potential danger-
or opportunity-that this case presented. Antislavery lawyers and politi-
cians had often been available to take important slavery cases to the Su-
preme Court. In United States v. The Amistad, former President John
Quincy Adams argued on behalf of a shipload of Africans who had re-
cently-and illegally-been imported from Africa to Cuba, where they
91. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
92. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 45, at 282.
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seized a ship which eventually landed off the coast of Connecticut.93 Simi-
larly, Senator William H. Seward of New York argued Jones v. Van Zandt
before the Supreme Court in 1847, and Senator Salmon P. Chase argued
the less well-known case of Moore v. Illinois in 1852. Both involved whites
accused of helping fugitive slaves escape.94
Oddly, no prominent antislavery lawyer offered to join Blair. The only
sensible explanation for this is that no one in the antislavery community
appreciated the importance of Dred Scott's appeal. Doubtless, most lawyers
expected the Supreme Court to reject Dred Scott's claim to freedom, but to
do it on narrow grounds, which would set no new precedent. In 1851 the
Court held in Strader v. Graham95 that each state had the power to decide
for itself the status of all people within its jurisdiction. Under this prece-
dent, Missouri was not required to recognize any "free" status that Dred
Scott might have acquired while living in Illinois or at Fort Snelling. Rely-
ing on Strader, the Court might simply, and without any great fanfare, have
affirmed that Dred Scott was still a slave. Initially the Court planned to
follow this route with Justice Samuel Nelson writing an opinion. Had the
Court followed this route the case would not have been controversial, and it
is unlikely that more than a handful of modem scholars would even know
of the case. Thus, when the case first went to Washington it seems likely
that most politicians and abolitionists expected an unimportant decision.
No one foresaw Taney's sweeping assault on the Missouri Compromise or
black rights.
Dred Scott appealed to the Supreme Court in December 1854, alleging
that Judge Wells had made an error in charging the jury that Dred Scott
was not entitled to his freedom. The appeal reached Washington too late for
the 1854 term, so the Supreme Court held the case over for the December
1855 term and finally heard arguments in February 1856.
93. The Amistad was a Spanish ship carrying slaves between two Cuban ports. The slaves re-
volted, killing most of the crew and forcing the survivors to steer the ship to Africa. The crew sailed the
ship east in the day, but north and west at night. Eventually the ship was brought into a port in Con-
necticut by the United States Coast Guard. After protracted litigation, the Supreme Court ruled that the
"Amistads," as the slaves were known, could neither be prosecuted for murder on the high seas nor
returned to their Cuban owners. The case is reported as United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
518 (1841). For a further discussion of this case, see HOWARD JONES, MUTINY ON THE AMISTAD: THE
SAGA OF A SLAVE REVOLT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN ABOLITION, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY (1987),
and PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 222-39 (1985).
94. See Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852); Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215
(1847). Chase also argued, and won on a technicality, Norris v. Crocker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 429 (1851),
the only antislavery victory before the Supreme Court in the 1850s. For a discussion of this case and the
surrounding events and litigation, see Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance,
and the Value of "Justice Delayed," 78 IOWA L. REV. 89 (1992).
95. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851).
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The briefs and the oral arguments, which lasted four days, 96 focused
on whether blacks could be citizens of the United States, the power of the
Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories, and the constitutionality of
the Missouri Compromise. In May the Court postponed a decision and
scheduled reargument for the following term on two crucial questions: (1)
whether the plea in abatement was legitimately before the Supreme Court;
and (2) whether a free Negro could be a citizen of a state, or of the United
States, and, as such, bring a suit in federal court based on diversity jurisdic-
tion.
In December 1856 the Court heard new arguments on these two issues
and also asked questions about the constitutionality of the Missouri Com-
promise. Significantly, none of the attorneys had briefed this issue. By this
time the case had attracted increased public attention. In this round the
eminent constitutional lawyer George T. Curtis, the brother of Supreme
Court Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, joined Blair in arguing for Scott's free-
dom. George T. Curtis was a political conservative who opposed the anti-
slavery movement. His presence showed that even conservatives had
become concerned that the Taney Court might overturn the Missouri Com-
promise and destroy what remained of sectional harmony in the nation.
What had begun in 1846 as an attempt by the Scotts to gain their freedom
had become a case with potentially monumental legal and political signifi-
cance.
Underscoring the political potential of the case was its timing. The
Court declined to render a decision in the spring of 1856 just as the presi-
dential campaign was heating up. Republicans would later argue that the
Court intentionally delayed the case in order to avoid giving ammunition to
that party in the upcoming election. In his "A House Divided" speech in
1858, Abraham Lincoln suggested that the delay was part of a deliberate
conspiracy to overturn the Missouri Compromise, force slavery into the
territories, and elect James Buchanan president.97
Some of the Justices may have wanted to avoid making a decision that
would affect presidential politics. However, this is quite different from the
kind of conspiracy that Republicans later charged. Such a far flung con-
spiracy seems unlikely, in part because Justice John McLean-who would
eventually write a stinging dissent in the case-voted for the delay.
McLean was vying for the 1856 Republican presidential nomination, and
96. Although the nineteenth-century Court often allowed arguments far longer than those today,
the four days devoted to this case indicate how important the Court thought it was.
97. See Abraham Lincoln, "A House Divided": Speech at Springfield, Illinois, (June 16, 1858), in
2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter LINCOLN
WORKS].
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had he given his dissent in May of that year it would have helped him in his
quest for that nomination. 98 The ambitious McLean surely had a strong
personal and political reason for trying to get the Court to decide the case
in the spring of 1856, but, like the other Justices, he supported the call for
reargument. The Justices were divided on a number of aspects of the case
and believed that further argument would clarify the issues. In any event, if
their goal was to keep the case out of presidential politics, it ultimately
backfired, as the case became a central issue in the 1860 presidential cam-
paign.
A. The Judges
The Court that heard Dred Scott's case was geographically balanced.
Four justices-James Wayne of Georgia, John Catron of Tennessee, Peter
V. Daniel of Virginia, and John A. Campbell of Alabama-were slavehold-
ing Southerners; one--Chief Justice Roger B. Taney-was a former slave-
owner from Maryland, a slaveholding border state; and four-John
McLean of Ohio, Robert C. Grier of Pennsylvania, Samuel Nelson of New
York, and Benjamin R. Curtis of Massachusetts-were Northerners who
had never owned slaves.
However, this geographic balance was deceptive. Only two of the jus-
tices-Daniel and Curtis-had been appointed by Northern presidents. The
rest had been appointed by Southern, slaveholding presidents. Moreover, of
the four Northerners, only one, McLean, was a known opponent of slavery.
A loyal Democrat when President Andrew Jackson had appointed him to
the Court, McLean had rejected the proslavery position of his party and
was the Court's only Justice openly hostile to slavery. By 1856 he had
abandoned the Democratic Party and its proslavery policies and had be-
come a Republican. Although from Massachusetts, Curtis was not even
moderately antislavery. As a young lawyer Curtis had unsuccessfully de-
fended the rights of slaveowners in Commonwealth v. Aves,99 the most
significant Northern case on the precise issue of Dred Scott-whether a
slave became free when a master voluntarily brought him into a free state.
98. Only in the last half of the twentieth century did Supreme Court Justices become divorced
from politics. Justice McLean was a viable candidate for the Republican nomination in 1856 and 1860.
Chief Justice Chase considered seeking a presidential nomination from the Bench. In 1916 Justice
Charles Evans Hughes left the Court to accept the Republican nomination for the presidency. In the
1940s Justice William 0. Douglas was considered as a possible vice presidential candidate. In the 1960s
Justice Arthur Goldberg left the bench to accept the political office as United States Ambassador to the
United Nations. His replacement, Justice Abe Fortas, provided political advice to President Lyndon
Johnson.
99. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836). For a full discussion of this case, see FINKELMAN, supra note
53, at 103-14.
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For the rest of his career, Curtis was tied to the conservative Cotton Whigs
in Massachusetts. His brother was a United States Commissioner under the
Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. His eventual dissent in Dred Scott probably
surprised most people in Massachusetts who knew him. However, while
most Republicans cheered the dissent, it was not motivated by hostility
towards slavery or sympathy for the Free Soil arguments of the Republican
Party. Rather, it was conservative response to what Curtis saw as Taney's
radical and dangerous departure from the long-standing spirit of compro-
mise over slavery found in the Whig Party and most of the Democratic
Party.
The other two Northerners on the bench-Nelson and Grier-were
typical Northern Democrats who regularly genuflected towards slavery.
Because the national Democratic Party was controlled by the Southern
majority within the Party, most Northern Democrats-such as Nelson and
Grier-always supported slavery and were known, insultingly, as "dough-
faces"--Northern men with Southern principles.100 Nelson and Grier could
be counted on to support slavery, along with the five Southerners on the
Court. Nelson and Grier hoped for a moderate opinion, upholding Scott's
status as a slave but not dealing with either the Missouri Compromise or
the status of blacks in the nation. Scott's attorneys could expect little sup-
port from these two Justices who had consistently supported the South in
Supreme Court cases dealing with slavery. 101
The other five members of the Court were Southerners with strong
personal and family ties to slavery. Chief Justice Taney came from a
wealthy and well-connected Maryland family that made its fortune in land-
holding, slaves, and tobacco planting. A Federalist member of the state
legislature in 1799-1800, he broke with the party when it failed to support
the War of 1812. In 1816 he won a five-year term in the Maryland Senate.
During this period he began to manumit his own slaves, not out of any
hostility to slavery, but because he apparently had no need for them. His
failure to sell his slaves suggests that as a young man he may have had
some moral qualms about dealing in human beings. But by the time he
became Andrew Jackson's Attorney General in 1831, Taney was a firm
supporter of the right to own slaves and a staunch opponent of black rights.
100. It was said that the Northern Democrats had faces of dough that the Southerners could shape
into anything they wanted.
101. Only once did Grier fail to fully support the South. In 1851 the Fillmore Administration had
initiated treason prosecutions against white abolitionists and free blacks who had refused to aid in the
capture of fugitive slaves at Christiana, Pennsylvania. Grier, who heard the case while riding circuit,
held that refusal to support the law--even resistance to the law--did not constitute treason, although he
would have upheld indictments under the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law. See Paul Finkelman, The Treason
Trial of Castner Hanway, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 77 (Michal R. Belknap ed., rev. ed. 1994).
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By the 1850s Taney was a seething, angry, uncompromising supporter of
the South and slavery and an implacable foe of racial equality, the Republi-
can Party, and the antislavery movement.
In the early 1830s, as President Andrew Jackson's Attorney General,
Taney had argued that blacks in the United States had no political or legal
rights, except those they "enjoy" at the "sufferance" and "mercy" of whites.
Foreshadowing his later Dred Scott opinion, as Attorney General Taney
had been ready to deny blacks any political or constitutional rights. He
wrote that blacks "even when free" were a "degraded class" whose "privi-
leges" were "accorded to them as a matter of kindness and benevolence
rather than right." Despite the fact that free blacks in a number of states had
voted at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, in the 1830s Taney, as
Attorney General, argued, "They [blacks] were not looked upon as citizens
by the contracting parties who formed the Constitution. They were evi-
dently not supposed to be included by the term citizens."10 2 Thus, although
not a slaveowner, Chief Justice Taney was a longtime opponent of any
rights for free blacks and a committed friend of slavery.
The other Southerners on the Court were universally supportive of
slavery. They differed only on the margins. Justice Wayne was a firm sup-
porter of slavery but was also a committed nationalist and an advocate of a
strong federal government. In that respect he reflected the politics of his
patron, Andrew Jackson. Wayne understood that the Constitution protected
slavery, and thus he correctly equated federal power and a strong national
government with support for the South's most important economic and
social institution. When his home state of Georgia seceded in 1861, Wayne,
the proslavery nationalist, remained on the federal bench. Catron was a
moderate proponent of national power because it could protect the South
from Northern antislavery forces. Like Wayne, Catron would remain on the
bench when his home state of Tennessee left the Union in 1861. Justice
Campbell was deeply committed to states' rights, while Justice Daniel was
fanatical in his support of slavery and states' rights and in his opposition to
black rights. In 1861 Campbell would leave the Court to join the Confeder-
acy. Daniel died in 1860 but would doubtless have joined the Confederacy
had he been alive.
In sum, the Court that heard Dred Scott's case was unlikely to support
his bid for freedom. Seven Democrats-five proslavery Southerners and
two Northern doughfaces-dominated the Court. Justice Curtis, while not a
Democrat, was a conservative tied by politics and family connections to the
102. Roger Taney, Unpublished Opinion of Attorney General Taney, quoted in CARL BRENT
SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 154 (1935).
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"Cotton Whigs" of Massachusetts, who were usually supportive of South-
ern interests. In 1836, as a young attorney Curtis had defended the right of
a master to bring a slave into Massachusetts. 103 Curtis's position on slavery
was, at best, uncertain when Dred Scott's case came before the Court. Only
one Justice, John McLean, openly opposed slavery.
B. The Compromise Not Taken
While the Taney Court was unlikely to support Dred Scott's appeal, it
need not have taken the extreme proslavery position that eventually
emerged. The Court might have avoided any great political issues by sim-
ply reaffirming the ruling of Strader v. Graham.104 In that case the Court
had held that, with the exception of runaway slaves who had to be returned
to their owners, every state had complete authority to decide for itself the
status of all people within its borders. Thus, the Northern states could free
visiting slaves, like Dred Scott, but the Southern states had complete
discretion to decide for themselves if a slave who had lived in the North
had become free. 105
The facts of Strader were somewhat different from those of Dred
Scott, but, nevertheless, the legal precedent in Strader could have been
applied to Dred Scott. Christopher Graham was the owner of three slave
musicians who boarded Jacob Strader's steamboat without Graham's per-
mission and then escaped to Canada. Under Kentucky law, a steamboat
owner was liable for the value of any slaves who escaped under these cir-
cumstances. Strader argued that he did not owe Graham money for the
slaves because they were free. Graham had previously allowed them to
travel to Indiana and Ohio where they worked as musicians. Strader as-
serted that under the laws of those states the slaves became free and once
free, they remained free. Strader also argued that the slaves had become
free under the Northwest Ordinance. The Kentucky courts denied these
claims, and on appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Taney rejected both arguments, declaring that "[e]very State has an un-
doubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social condition, of
the persons domiciled within its territory .... ,,106 Taney also concluded
that the Northwest Ordinance ceased to be in force once the territory it
103. The case is Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, which Curtis lost. This case is
discussed at length in LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE
SHAW 59-69 (1957), and in FINKELMAN, supra note 53, at 103-28.
104. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82(1851).
105. Id. at 93. The status of fugitive slaves found in the North was governed by Article IV, Section
2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution and not by state law.
106. Id.
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governed became a state. Thus, the Ordinance could not affect the status of
slaves who entered Indiana or Ohio. Therefore Graham's slaves had not
been emancipated by the Ordinance when they visited Ohio and Indiana.
But even if the Ordinance had been in force, Taney asserted that congres-
sional legislation for a particular territory "could have no force beyond" the
limits of that territory. Thus, once they left the territory, they abandoned
any claims to freedom based on the Ordinance. This analysis would apply
to Dred Scott.
Strader was not perfectly analogous to Dred Scott. Graham's slaves
had never sued for their freedom. They were already in Canada by the time
Graham sued Strader. Moreover, the Kentucky court did not deny (as the
Missouri court had) that slaves living in a free state became free. The Ken-
tucky court merely asserted that a short visit to a free state would not end
their bondage. Nevertheless, the legal principle of Strader would have al-
lowed the Taney Court to settle Dred Scott without controversy. Most ob-
servers, in fact, expected the Court to reaffirm the principles of Strader that
every state had the authority to determine the status of people in its
jurisdiction. This may explain why the antislavery community initially
ignored Dred Scott.
At first the Court seemed to be moving in the direction of using
Strader to settle the case. In February 1857 Justice Nelson began drafting
an opinion that was to serve as the "Opinion of the Court." Nelson's draft,
which eventually became his concurring opinion, avoided all of the contro-
versial aspects of the case. He asserted that Scott was not free because his
status turned on Missouri law, and that Missouri had already declared Scott
to be a slave. Had the Court wished to avoid controversy, this was the path.
In the end, the Court did not avoid controversy, because the proslavery
Justices wanted a decision that would deal with the constitutionality of the
Missouri Compromise and the rights of free blacks. In essence, by rejecting
the Nelson approach, these Justices sought confrontation rather than com-
promise.
For at least a decade, the nation had faced constant political turmoil
over the status of slavery in the territories. Northern resistance to the Fugi-
tive Slave Law of 1850 further heightened sectional tensions. Even as Jus-
tice Nelson wrote his opinion, the Southerners on the Court, especially
Justice James M. Wayne of Georgia, pushed for a more comprehensive
result. They wanted Taney to write an opinion that would settle-in favor
of the South-the issues of slavery in the territories and the rights of free
blacks. If the Court held the Missouri Compromise to be unconstitutional,
then all the territories would be open to slavery. If the Court declared that
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blacks could never be citizens of the United States, then alleged fugitive
slaves and their white friends might be less able to resist the 1850 Fugitive
Slave Law.
The Southern majority on the Court wanted Taney to decide three
questions in favor of the South:
1. Could blacks sue in federal court as state citizens and as citizens of
the United States?
2. Did Congress have the power to prohibit slavery in the territories?
In other words, was the Missouri Compromise constitutional?
3. Was Missouri obligated to recognize Dred Scott's freedom based
on his residence in either Illinois or the Wisconsin Territory?
C. The Jurisdictional Question
In order to reach these issues, the Supreme Court first had to address
the jurisdictional issue, just as Judge Wells had needed to do in the federal
district court. This raised a confusing and technical question. Despite its
complexity, this question went to the heart of the case and later became a
major political issue after the Court issued its decision.
If blacks could be citizens of states, then Dred Scott had an apparent
right to sue John Sanford in federal court in order to test his status. How-
ever, if blacks could not be citizens, then Dred Scott, even if legitimately
entitled to be free, could not legally sue in a federal court, and the case was
not legitimately before the Supreme Court. If this were true, then the Court
could not hear or decide the case, but could only dismiss it for want of ju-
risdiction.
The following double quandary emerged. The Southern majority on
the Court wanted Taney to rule that blacks could never be citizens of the
United States and never sue in federal court as "citizens of a state." How-
ever, such a conclusion should have immediately ended the case, because if
Dred Scott could not sue, then his case could not be heard, and Chief Jus-
tice Taney was obligated to dismiss the case. If this happened, then Taney
could not rule on the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.
On the other hand, if Taney ruled on the constitutionality of the Mis-
souri Compromise, he would presumably first have to acknowledge the
Court's jurisdiction in the case, and that meant affirming (or at least not
reversing) Judge Wells's ruling on the citizenship question-a ruling that
allowed free blacks to sue in federal courts.
Some of the Justices did not believe the question of black citizenship
was even before the Court. In the circuit court John Sanford had filed the
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plea in abatement asking Judge Wells to immediately dismiss Dred Scott's
suit on the grounds that a black could never be considered a citizen. Judge
Wells had ruled against the plea in abatement but then sided with Sanford
on the question of Dred Scott's freedom. Thus, no one appealed the ruling
on the plea in abatement. When Scott appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court, he did not ask the Court to review Judge Wells's ruling that
he had a right to sue, because Wells had ruled in his favor. On the other
hand, because Sanford won the case he did not appeal any aspect of it. Be-
cause neither side appealed Judge Wells's ruling on the plea in abatement,
some of the Justices argued that the question of citizenship itself was not
legitimately before the Court.
VIII. THE DECISION
Ultimately, Taney did not dismiss the case but, in a bold move, denied
that blacks could sue in federal court and then still addressed the other con-
stitutional issues before him. His decision, in the end, would be so contro-
versial because it was so audacious.
A. Free Blacks Under Taney's Constitution: "They Had No Rights"
Even though no one appealed the ruling on the plea in abatement,
Taney correctly concluded that the right of a black to sue in federal court
was legitimately before the Supreme Court. Thus, he had to address the
issue of black citizenship and the right of free blacks to sue in diversity in
federal court. Taney believed this was so because every court has a right to
consider, on its own, whether it has jurisdiction to hear a case. On this point
Taney was probably on firm legal ground, even though a number of his
colleagues disagreed. However, the way Taney framed the issue in his
opinion indicates his determination to use the case to decide the status of
blacks in America. Taney wrote,
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported
into this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political
community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privi-
leges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen? One
of which rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in
the cases specified in the Constitution. 107
Taney argued that free blacks-even those allowed to vote in the states
where they lived--could never be citizens of the United States and have
107. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,403 (1857).
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standing to sue in federal courts. Here Taney set up the novel concept of
dual citizenship. He argued that being a citizen of a state did not necessar-
ily make one a citizen of the United States.
Taney's argument was at odds with the text of the Constitution itself.
Throughout the Constitution, references to national citizenship are almost
always tied to state citizenship. The right to vote for national legislators, for
example, which is found in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, was tied
to the states. Article III, Section 2 provides for a right to sue in federal
courts when "Citizens of different States" sued each other. Article IV, Sec-
tion 1 requires the states to grant citizens of other states equal "Privileges
and Immunities," which implies that citizenship in one state gives you cer-
tain rights as a citizen throughout the country. Thus, before Dred Scott,
most Americans assumed that anyone who was considered a citizen of a
state was also a citizen of the United States. 108 According to historian
James H. Kettner, the leading expert on this issue, by 1857 the United
States had "a long popular and judicial tradition of considering the two
[state and national citizenship] as inseparable dimensions of the same
status." 109
Taney had other ideas. He claimed that
[i]n discussing this question, we must not confound the rights of citizen-
ship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the rights of
citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow,
because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he
must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and
privileges of the citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights
and privileges of a citizen in any other State. I 10
Taney based this novel argument entirely on race. He offered a slanted
and one-sided history of the Founding period, which ignored the fact that
free blacks had voted in a number of states at the time of the ratification of
the Constitution. Ignoring this history, the Chief Justice argued that at the
founding of the nation blacks were either all slaves or, if free, without any
political or legal rights. He declared that blacks
are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word
"citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights
and privileges which the instrument provides for and secures to citizens
of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time [1787] con-
108. The opposite was not true. It was possible to be a citizen of Washington, D.C., or a federal
territory, and thus not be a citizen of state, but still be a citizen of the United States. See Hepburn v.
ElIzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805); Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 F. Cas. 1278 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No.
11,385). This issue is discussed in JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,
1608-1870, at 248-86 (1978).
109. KETTNER, supra note 108, at 328.
110. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405.
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sidered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been sub-
jugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet re-
mained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges but such
as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant
them. 111
According to Taney, blacks were "so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect .... ,"11 2 Thus, he concluded that
blacks could never be citizens of the United States, even if they were born
in the country and considered to be citizens of the states in which they
lived.
This dual citizenship, for example, meant that Massachusetts, where
blacks were full and equal citizens, could not force its notions of citizen-
ship on the slave states. It also meant that Southern states did not have to
grant privileges and immunities, or any other rights, to the free black citi-
zens of Massachusetts and other Northern states.11 3 The implications for
this argument were profound, since in Massachusetts and few other North-
ern states blacks were voters and officeholders.
Having reached this conclusion, however, it seems that Taney could
not then consider the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. If Dred
Scott had no right to sue in federal court, then the Supreme Court should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. In his dissent Justice Ben-
jamin R. Curtis argued precisely this point. However, the logic of the ar-
gument did not stop the determined Chief Justice, who went on to declare
the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional.
Many Republicans would later argue that everything Taney said about
the Missouri Compromise was dicta, which was unnecessary to the out-
come of the case. Taney's critics asserted that the Chief Justice's superflu-
ous discussion of the Missouri Compromise was irrelevant and unnecessary
to the decision, and thus not legally binding, because they argued he had no
jurisdiction to decide this issue once he ruled on the citizenship question. In
1858 Congressman Calvin C. Chaffee (who had married Irene Sanford
Emerson) asserted that "[t]he dictum of the Court is a very different affair
from a decision."114 From 1857 onward, Republicans argued that despite
the Dred Scott decision, Congress retained the right to prohibit slavery in
territories because all discussion of the congressional power over slavery in
the territories was dicta.
11. Id. at 404-05.
112. Id. at 407.
113. Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution declares, "The Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
114. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., 852-55, quoted in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 45, at
473.
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B. The Status of Slavery in the Territories Under Dred Scott
Whether it was dicta or not, Taney was determined to discuss the con-
stitutionality of the Missouri Compromise and the status of slavery in the
territories. His goal was to settle, finally and forever-in favor of the
South-the status of slavery in the territories. To do this Taney had to
overcome two strong arguments in favor of congressional power over slav-
ery in territories. First was the clause in the Constitution that explicitly
gave Congress the power to regulate the territories. Second was the politi-
cal tradition, dating from the Northwest Ordinance, that Congress had such
a power. Taney accomplished this through an examination of two separate
provisions of the Constitution: the Territories Clause and the Fifth Amend-
ment.
1. The Territories Clause
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that "Con-
gress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regu-
lations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States .... ." Congress had always assumed this clause gave it the power to
govern the territories. As we have seen, Congress had often exercised its
power under this clause, prohibiting slavery in some territories and allow-
ing it in others. In the Kansas-Nebraska Act,1 15 Congress had even reversed
course, allowing slavery in territories where it was previously prohibited.
Except for the occasional voice of Southern protest, no one seemed to
doubt that Congress had the power to prohibit slavery in the territories. No
one, that is, except for Chief Justice Taney.
In order to find the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, Taney re-
read the Territories Clause in a way that few others had ever considered
plausible. Taking his cue from a handful of extreme proslavery Democrats,
including Senator Geyer who represented Sanford before the Supreme
Court, Taney argued that the Territories Clause in Article IV only applied
to those territories the United States owned in 1787. Taney wrote that the
clause was
confined, and was intended to be confined, to the territory which at that
time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States, and was within
their boundaries as settled by the treaty with Great Britain, and can have
no influence upon a territory afterwards acquired from a foreign Gov-
ernment. It was a special provision for a known and particular territory,
and to meet a present emergency, and nothing more. 116
115. Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
116. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 432.
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In his Pulitzer Prize winning study of the case, Don E. Fehrenbacher
correctly described this thoroughly unpersuasive argument as "[t]en pages
of rambling, repetitious prose" that is "difficult to take... seriously." As
Fehrenbacher noted, Taney "quoted no framers of the Constitution, cited no
court decisions in support of his bizarre explication." ' 1 7 Absurdly, Taney
argued that the Framers did not contemplate the acquisition of any new
territories and, because they had none in mind, the Clause could not be
applied to them.118 He was wrong on two counts. The Framers already had
their eye on acquiring New Orleans, which was then in Spanish hands.
Moreover, the entire Constitution was written with expectations of a chang-
ing world. The logical extension of Taney's argument would be to prohibit
congressional regulation of anything invented or discovered after 1787.
Taney conceded that Congress had the power to provide a minimal
government in the territories, at least at the earliest stages of settlement.' 19
He argued this power did not come from the Territories Clause. Rather, it
came from the preceding clause in Article IV, which said, "New States may
be admitted by the Congress into this Union .... ,,120 This provision of the
Constitution, Taney believed, allowed Congress to provide the initial gov-
ernment for a territory but nothing beyond that. Taney implied that allow-
ing Congress to actually govern the territories would be equivalent to
"establish[ing] or maintain[ing] colonies bordering on the United States or
at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure .... ,,121 Taney's
argument here was silly and absurd. In 1857 the United States had held
some territory (what later became the eastern tip of Minnesota) for the en-
tire period since the adoption of the Constitution without making it a state.
But neither had Congress treated the territory as a "colony."
The weakness of his argument on the Territories Clause did not stop
Taney, who was determined, as few Justices have been, to reach a specific
result. Weak arguments or faulty logic would not stand in his way. His goal
was to prohibit congressional regulation of slavery in the territories, and
any argument, it seems, would do the trick.
Taney must have understood the inherent weakness of his arguments
about the lack of congressional power to govern the territories. Even if, as
Taney asserted, Congress had only minimal powers to prepare the territo-
ries for statehood, there was no reason why that minimal power could not
117. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 45, at 367.
118. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 438.
119. Seeid. at447.
120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
121. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 446.
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include the right to prohibit slavery. Thus, Taney turned to the Bill of
Rights to plug the hole in his Territories Clause argument.
2. The Fifth Amendment
In his discussion of the Bill of Rights, Taney wanted to accomplish
two goals. Most obviously he wanted to overrule the prohibition on slavery
in the Missouri Compromise. Secondarily, he wanted to make a preemptive
strike against popular sovereignty by ruling that territorial legislatures
could not ban slavery. Taney achieved these goals with three interrelated
arguments.
First Taney argued that Congress could not violate the Bill of Rights
in the territories. This seems reasonable and persuasive. As an example,
Taney asserted,
[N]o one, we presume, will contend that Congress can make any law in a
Territory respecting the establishment of religion, or the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of
the people of the Territory peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for the redress of grievances. 122
Taney further argued that Congress could not prohibit the right to a jury
trial or deny people their right against self-incrimination. 123
Having established the obvious-that the Bill of Rights applied to the
territories-Taney turned to the second part of his argument: that forbid-
ding slavery in the territories violated the Due Process and Just Compensa-
tion Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, which declared that under federal
law no person could "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken.., without just compen-
sation.' ' 124 Taney contended that
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his prop-
erty into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had commit-
ted no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name
of due process of law. 125
In one of the earliest uses of "substantive due process" analysis, Taney
argued that no law could be constitutional if it arbitrarily denied a person
his property merely for taking that property into a federal territory.
For many commentators, at the time and since, Taney's argument
proved too much. No one believed that the Fifth Amendment prohibited
122. Id. at 450.
123. Id.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
125. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450.
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Congress from banning dangerous, pernicious, or morally offensive forms
of property from federal jurisdictions. In the nineteenth century, states
banned things like liquor and lottery tickets from their jurisdictions. The
states clearly had the power to act against such types of property, even if
the Commerce Clause or some other provision of the Constitution empow-
ered Congress to regulate such goods. 126 Congress surely had the same
power in federal jurisdictions. For example, Congress, which had full law-
making power for the District of Columbia, allowed local officials there to
ban abolitionist publications just as the Southern states did. Since the Con-
federation period, Congress had always considered slavery to be a special
sort of property that could be banned, in part because it was not normal
property, but could only exist if supported by positive law. The Northwest
Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise both showed that slavery was a
form of special property that required special laws and might be prohibited
on grounds of public safety or public policy.
Taney, however, simply turned this argument inside out. He argued
that slavery was indeed a special form of property, but one that deserved
greater protection. Thus he wrote,
[T]he right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in
the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of mer-
chandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United
States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years. And the Gov-
ernment in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the
slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words-too plain to
be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which
gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles
property of that kind to less protection than property of any other de-
scription. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty
of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights. 127
Thus, Chief Justice Taney declared that any prohibition on slavery in
the territories violated the Fifth Amendment. Even the people of a territory
could not ban slavery through the territorial legislature. Taney wrote,
And if Congress itself cannot do this-if it is beyond the powers con-
ferred on the Federal Government-it will be admitted, we presume, that
it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise them. It could
confer no power on any local Government, established by its authority,
to violate the provisions of the Constitution.128
126. See, e.g., The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821).
127. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451-52.
128. Id. at 451. Both of Taney's arguments on congressional power in the territories could have
been powerfully turned against slavery. Taney's argument that Congress had no general power to
legislate for the territories might have been used to assert that Congress had no power to pass any law
creating or allowing slavery in the territories. Similarly, Taney's Fifth Amendment argument created a
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Like the Missouri Compromise, under Taney's interpretation of the Consti-
tution, popular sovereignty was also unconstitutional.
IX. THE LAW AS POLITICS
Taney's goals in Dred Scott were more political than legal. He could
easily have upheld Dred Scott's slave status without commenting on the
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise or the rights of free blacks.
But Taney hoped to resolve the festering problem of slavery in the territo-
ries so that it would no longer be a central issue in American politics. By
declaring Congress had no power to ban slavery from the territories, Taney,
in effect, was trying to preempt all political discussion and debate on this
issue. There was, after all, no point in debating an issue if Congress could
not pass legislation on it. Taney seemed to expect that when the Court ruled
against congressional power over slavery in the territories, political debate
over the issue would end. Taney believed, or at least hoped, that politicians
would accept his resolution of the problem.
A. The Logic of Taney's Opinion
While in hindsight this expectation seems naive, Taney had some
good reasons for believing he could accomplish this goal. Since the end of
the Mexican War in 1847, the nation had been bitterly divided-
traumatized-by the problem of slavery in the territories. During the Mexi-
can War, Northern Congressmen had backed the Wilmot Proviso, which
would have banned slavery in all land acquired from Mexico, known as the
Mexican Cession. The House of Representatives, with its large Northern
majority, supported the proviso, while the Senate, where the South had a
temporary advantage, defeated the proviso. 129 By 1850 the North had parity
in the Senate, but in the Compromise of 1850 Congress nevertheless al-
double-edged sword against slavery. The full text of the Due Process Clause declared "nor shall any
person.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Taney argued that it was a violation of "due process" to take property from people who
merely entered a federal jurisdiction. By applying that logic to the slaves themselves, abolitionists
might have argued that it was a denial of "liberty" to allow someone to be enslaved in a federal terri-
tory. Numerous abolitionists, including Theodore Dwight Weld, Salmon P. Chase (a future Chief
Justice), and William Goodell made such arguments. See WIECEK, SOURCES, supra note 79, at 190-98,
255,265-67.
129. Seats in the House of Representatives are based on population. The North, with its much
larger population, had far more seats in the House than the South. In the Senate, each state had two
seats, and throughout this period, the North and South usually had either the same number of Senate
seats, or one section had an advantage of two or four seats for a short time. For example, in 1845 both
Texas and Florida entered the Union, giving the South a four seat advantage in the Senate until 1846
and 1848 when Iowa and Wisconsin entered the Union. The admission of California in 1850 gave the
North a permanent advantage in the Senate.
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lowed slavery in all of the Mexican Cession except California. This huge
territory encompasses most of the present-day states of New Mexico, Ari-
zona, Utah, Nevada, and Colorado. Finally, in 1854, with a free state ma-
jority in both the House and the Senate, Congress passed the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, 130 which repealed the Missouri Compromise's slavery pro-
hibition as it applied to territories, which included present-day Kansas,
Nebraska, and all or part of the Dakotas, Montana, Colorado, and Wyo-
ming. By 1857 slavery was legal in all but a handful of territories-those
encompassing the present-day states of Minnesota, Oregon, Washington,
and Idaho. In Dred Scott, Taney may have seen himself as doing little more
than finishing the job Congress had begun in 1850: opening all federal
lands to slavery.
Taney may have also felt there was a political mandate for his deci-
sion. In the election of 1856, the new Republican party emerged and
pledged to stop the spread of slavery into the West. The new party made an
excellent showing. Running a national hero, John C. Frrmont-the great
"Pathfinder of the West"--the Party carried eleven of the sixteen free
states. But this was not enough to defeat Pennsylvania's James Buchanan,
who swept the South and carried five free states. With hindsight we see that
the 1856 election was a prelude to the Republican victory in 1860, but
Taney interpreted the Democratic victory as a mandate for a continued
deregulation of the territories and a national rejection of the free soil prin-
ciples of the Republicans.
The main goal of the Republican Party was to prevent the spread of
slavery to the territories. From Taney's perspective the Republican Party
was a dangerous, sectional organization that might push the nation toward
civil war. Taney rejected the premises of the Republicans-that slavery
was an evil which must, in the words of Lincoln, be put "in course of ulti-
mate extinction." 131 Taney believed the Republican Party was an evil and
hoped his decision would put it on the course of ultimate extinction.
If the nation accepted his ruling-that Congress could not prohibit
slavery in the territories-then the raison d'etre for the Republicans would
disappear, the sectional party would die, and the nation could go back to
politics as usual. Meanwhile, the settlement of the continent, which Taney
like so many other Americans believed was part of the nation's "manifest
destiny," could continue.
Many people in the country, including President-elect James Bu-
chanan, wanted the Supreme Court to settle the issue of slavery in the terri-
130. Kansas-Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
131. Lincoln, supra note 97, at 461.
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tories once and for all. In his inaugural address, delivered just two days
before Taney announced his opinion, Buchanan had said that the issue of
slavery in the territories was "a judicial question, which legitimately be-
longs to the Supreme Court of the United States." Knowing the Court
would soon decide Dred Scott, Buchanan declared that the issue of slavery
in the territories would "be speedily and finally settled." Buchanan pledged
to "cheerfully submit" to this decision, as he believed would "all good citi-
zens."
132
Buchanan's prophecy was ill-fated. Instead, Taney's decision-and
the legitimacy of that decision-became the focus of political debate in the
nation. The ruling on the Missouri Compromise provided Republicans with
political ammunition for the political campaigns of 1858 and 1860.
Two Justices, McLean and Curtis, offered extensive dissents to
Taney's opinion. Curtis in particular undermined most of Taney's historical
arguments, showing that blacks had voted in a number of states at the
Founding. He noted that
[a]t the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free
native-born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
New York, New Jersey, and North Carolina, though descended from Af-
rican slaves, were not only citizens of those States, but such of them as
had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of electors,
on equal terms with other citizens. 133
Thus, they were constituent members of the nation and could not now be
denied the right to claim citizenship.
Republicans around the nation embraced the dissents. As noted earlier
in this article, Horace Greeley, the Republican editor of the New York
Tribune published a pamphlet edition of Taney's opinion and the Curtis
dissent to help the Republican cause. Greeley's paper, the nation's leading
Republican Paper, responded to the decision with outrage, calling Taney's
opinion "wicked," "atrocious," "abominable," and a "collation of false
statements and shallow sophistries." Similarly, the Chicago Tribune de-
clared that Taney's statements on black citizenship were "inhuman
dicta."1 34
132. James Buchanan, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1857), in 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 2961, 2962 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
133. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 572-73 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
134. Both papers are quoted in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 45, at 417.
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B. The Republican Fear of a Conspiracy
For many Republicans, including Abraham Lincoln, the case symbol-
ized the grave threat to the free states and to democracy itself posed by
Chief Justice Taney and the Supreme Court. When nominated to run for the
Senate in 1858, Lincoln spoke of a conspiracy to nationalize slavery that
had been hatched by Taney, President James Buchanan, and Lincoln's op-
ponent, Stephen A. Douglas. He saw the conspiracy as beginning with the
Compromise of 1850, which Douglas had almost single-handedly guided
through the House of Representatives; the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which
Douglas had sponsored; and then the Dred Scott decision. The final step in
this process would be to open up the free states to slavery.
A conspiracy dating from the Compromise of 1850 to overturn the
Missouri Compromise seems a bit far-fetched, but the actions of both
Taney and Buchanan gave it some credibility. In his inaugural address,
Buchanan pledged to support the Court's decision in Dred Scott. He deliv-
ered this speech just two days before the Court announced the outcome of
the case. As he walked to the podium to take the oath of office and give his
inaugural address, Buchanan stopped to briefly confer or chat with Chief
Justice Taney. The crowd at the inauguration witnessed this conversation,
and Americans later read about it in their newspapers.
Republicans publicly speculated that in this conversation Taney had
told Buchanan what the Court was about to decide. Senator William Henry
Seward of New York would later claim that the "whisperings" between
Taney and Buchanan were part of a conspiracy to hang "the millstone of
slavery" on the western territories. 135 Only a few minutes after this "whis-
pering," Buchanan urged the nation to accept and support the forthcoming
decision in Dred Scott. Seward, Lincoln, and other Republicans claimed
that during the public "whisperings" Taney told Buchanan how the Court
would decide the case.
We will never know what Taney said to Buchanan, but we now know
that Buchanan already knew what the Court was going to decide. In a ma-
jor breach of Court etiquette, Justice Grier, who, like Buchanan, was from
Pennsylvania, had kept the President-elect fully informed about the pro-
gress of the case and the internal debates within the Court. When Buchanan
urged the nation to support the decision, he already knew what Taney
would say. Republican suspicions of impropriety turned out to be fully
justified. There may have been no ongoing conspiracy, but collusion
135. CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 941, quoted in FEHRENBACHER, supra note 45, at 473.
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abounded. The Court and the President-elect worked closely to get the de-
cision Buchanan and Taney wanted and to get the nation to accept it.
Lincoln also articulated, as did other Republicans, that Dred Scott was
the first step in a Democratic conspiracy to nationalize slavery. In his "A
House Divided" speech, Lincoln warned that continued Democratic rule
would soon lead to a nationalization of slavery. Lincoln told his fellow
Republicans, "We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of
Missouri are on the verge of making their Stateftee; and we shall awake to
the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave
state." 136 Lincoln was convinced that the "logical conclusion" of Dred
Scott was that what one "master might lawfully do with Dred Scott, in the
free state of Illinois, every master might lawfully do with any other one, or
one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free State."'137
In his speeches in the 1858 senatorial campaign and his debates with
Douglas, Lincoln stressed the illegality of the Dred Scott decision and the
dangers it posed for the nation. He lost the 1858 election to the incumbent,
Senator Stephen A. Douglas, but in the process Lincoln became his party's
most articulate critic of Chief Justice Taney. In 1859 Lincoln campaigned
throughout the North on behalf of Republicans. Once again he stressed the
dangers of Dred Scott. For example, in a speech in Columbus he warned
that some future Supreme Court case would be like a "second Dred Scott
decision" and would make "slavery lawful in all the States." 138 By the
spring of 1860, Lincoln had emerged as a dark horse candidate for the
presidency. Virtually unknown two years earlier, he capitalized on Chief
Justice Taney's opinion by attacking it. In 1860 he would gain his party's
nomination and the presidency. Even before he took office, seven states
would declare themselves out of the Union. The decision that Taney hoped
would end sectional strife instead hurried the nation into war. As I noted at
the beginning of this article, it is wrong to think that Dred Scott caused the
Civil War. A breakdown of the Union over slavery was inevitable. But, the
decision set the stage for the War. It provided Lincoln with the ammunition
he needed to become his party's leader. This allowed the Republicans to
nominate a Midwestern moderate who could carry the crucial states of the
lower North-Illinois, Indiana, and Pennsylvania-and win the election.
While most opponents of slavery had condemned the decision, the
black abolitionist and former slave Frederick Douglass saw hope in this
136. Lincoln, supra note 97, at 467.
137. Id. at 464-65.
138. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 16, 1859), in 3 LINCOLN WORKS, supra
note 97, at 400, 404; see also id. at 421,423.
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most dreadful case. He told a New York audience, "You will readily ask
me how I am affected by this devilish decision-this judicial incarnation of
wolfishness! My answer is, and no thanks to the slaveholding wing of the
Supreme Court, my hopes were never brighter than now." Douglass be-
lieved that the decision would raise "the National Conscience." Moreover,
he saw in the decision the beginning of the great cataclysm that could de-
stroy slavery:
The Supreme Court of the United States is not the only power in this
world. It is very great, but the Supreme Court of the Almighty is greater.
Judge Taney can do many things, but he cannot perform impossibilities.
He cannot bale out the ocean, annihilate this firm old earth, or pluck the
silvery star of liberty from our Northern sky. He may decide, and decide
again; but he cannot reverse the decision of the Most High. He cannot
change the essential nature of things-making evil good, and good,
evil. 139
Douglass was more correct then he could have imagined. Thus, while
we consider the legacy of Dred Scott we must remember that the case led
to the crisis of the Union, secession, and Civil War. The War not only pre-
served the Union but ended slavery and allowed the nation to rewrite the
Constitution, and thus bring about "a new birth of freedom."' 140 Ironically,
the end of slavery would probably not have come so quickly, or perhaps
even so completely, had it not been for Chief Justice Taney's overreaching
opinion in Dred Scott.
139. Frederick Douglass, The Dred Scott Decision: Speech Delivered, in Part, at the Anniversary of
the American Abolition Society (May 14, 1857), in Two SPEECHES BY FREDERICK DOUGLASS 27, 31
(1857).
140. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov.
19, 1863), in 7 LINCOLN WORKS, supra note 97, at 22, 23.
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